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Notes and Comments
Has the Antiquities Act Gone
Down With the Ship?
A Preemption Analysis of
Rhode Island's Shipwreck Laws
I. INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 2000, marine archeologist D.K. Abbass
piqued international interest by announcing her theory that a
shipwreck discovered just off the shore of Newport, Rhode Island,
was the long-lost vessel of the esteemed explorer and navigator
Captain James Cook.' The vessel, originally named The Endeav-
our and subsequently renamed The Lord Sandwich, was leased by
the British Navy during the American War for Independence. 2 It
is believed that The Endeavour was one of thirteen transport ves-
sels scuttled by the British on August 8, 1780, to blockade Newport
Harbor.3 Although it was later found that the wreck was not the
famed vessel,4 the excitement has put the subject of state and fed-
eral control of shipwrecks on the table for discussion. Depending
on the facts of each case, either federal legislation, state law or the
general maritime law governs the treatment of shipwrecks. 5 This
comment will address the preemptive effect that federal legislation
1. See Jerry O'Brien, Rhode Island Wreck Is Not Lost Vessel of Capt. James
Cook, Prov. J. Bull., Dec. 14, 2000, at B-1.
2. See Australian National Maritime Museum, The Search for the Endeav-
our, at http://www.anmm.gov.au/findhmbe.htm (last visited May 5, 2001).
3. See id.
4. See O'Brien, supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106
(1994); Antiquities Act of Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-45.1-1 to 45.1-13
(1956) (1993 Reenactment); Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked &
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 567 (5th Cir. 1981) (Treasure Salvors II)
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and the general maritime law have on Rhode Island's shipwreck
laws.
Traditionally, the general maritime laws of salvage and finds
have governed the treatment of shipwrecks. 6 However, in 1987,
Congress approved the passage of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of
1987 (ASA).7 On April 28, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed
the bill into law.8 Exercising its power to "fix and determine the
maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country,"9 Con-
gress stated that shipwrecks subject to the ASA are no longer gov-
erned by the laws of salvage or finds. 10 Through the ASA, the
United States asserts title to certain shipwrecks." Title to those
shipwrecks is simultaneously "transfer[red] to the state in or on
whose submerged lands the shipwreck is located." 12 Rhode Island
has also found it to be in its interest to govern the treatment of
certain shipwrecks located in its waters.' 3 Since 1974, the state
has governed these shipwrecks through the Antiquities Act of
Rhode Island (Antiquities Act).' 4
With this many regulatory cooks in the galley, a problem of
preemption looms ominously on the horizon. The United States
Supreme Court passed on its opportunity to clarify the interplay
between state shipwreck laws, the general maritime law and the
ASA. 15 In 1994, a company named Deep Sea Research, Inc. (DSR)
filed suit in rem against a vessel named the Brother Jonathan in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia.' 6 In 1865, the Brother Jonathan, a 220-foot, wooden-
hulled, double side-wheeled steamship sank after striking a sub-
merged rock off the coast of California.' 7 The vessel came to rest
(noting that shipwrecks are subject to the general maritime laws of salvage and
finds).
6. See Treasure Salvors 11, 640 F.2d at 567-68.
7. See Anne G. Giesecke, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act Through the Eyes of
its Drafter, 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 167, 168 (1999).
8. See id. at 167.
9. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917).
10. See 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a).
11. See id. § 2105(a).
12. See id. § 2105(c).
13. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-45.1-2 (1956) (1993 Reenactment).
14. See 1974 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 161, § 1.
15. See California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 508-09 (1998) (de-
clining to undertake a preemption analysis of the ASA).
16. See id. at 496.
17. See id. at 495.
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under 200 feet of water on submerged lands of the state.18 Most of
the Brother Jonathan's passengers and crew perished in the hour
that it took for the ship to sink.19 The ship's cargo, including a
shipment of gold worth an estimated value of $2 million and a
United States Army payroll worth an estimated $250,000, was also
lost in the sinking.20
Based on its possession of several artifacts retrieved from the
Brother Jonathan, DSR sought either an award of title to the ship
or a salvage award for its efforts in recovering the wreck.21 Califor-
nia intervened in the action claiming to have an interest in the
Brother Jonathan based on the ASA and section 6313 of the Cali-
fornia Public Resource Code (section 6313).22 Section 6313 pur-
ports to vest title in the state "to all abandoned shipwrecks ... on
or in the tide and submerged lands of California."23 California
moved to dismiss the case arguing that, because the ASA and sec-
tion 6313 vested title to the Brother Jonathan in the state, DSR's
in rem action against the vessel was an action against the state
and consequently, the Eleventh Amendment precluded a federal
court from hearing the case.2 4
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's de-
nial of California's motion to dismiss because the state had failed
to establish a colorable claim to the wreck of the Brother Jonathan
under the ASA because the state had not shown, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the wreck was abandoned. 25 Accordingly,
California did not have title to the ship under the ASA 26 Further,
the circuit court affirmed the district court's holding that Califor-
nia's claim to the Brother Jonathan under section 6313 could not
survive because the state statute was preempted to the extent that
it granted California title to shipwrecks that are beyond the scope
of the ASA.2 7 Without a colorable claim of title to the Brother
18. See id. at 496.
19. See id. at 495.
20. See id.
21. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 496.
22. See id.
23. See id. (quoting Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 6313 (West Supp. 2001)).
24. See id. at 496-97.
25. See id. at 498.
26. See id. at 498-99.
27. See Deep Sea Research 523 U.S. at 498.
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Jonathan under the ASA, California could not have DSR's action
dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity.
California petitioned for, and was granted, certiorari. The Su-
preme Court considered: 1) whether a failure to dismiss the case
against California would violate the Eleventh Amendment; 2)
whether the Brother Jonathan is subject to the ASA and; 3)
whether the ASA preempts section 6313.28 First, the Court stated
that the Eleventh Amendment would not be implicated in an in
rem admiralty action in a case, such as the Brother Jonathan,
where the state was not in possession of the wreck.29 Second, ad-
dressing the applicability of the ASA to the wreck, the Court held
that the requisite element of abandonment under the ASA is to be
given its traditional admiralty meaning.30 However, that issue
was remanded to the district court for reconsideration because the
district court's conclusion that California had failed to prove that
the Brother Jonathan was abandoned "was necessarily influenced
by the assumption that the Eleventh Amendment was relevant to
the courts' inquiry."3 1 Justice O'Connor opined that the lower
court's determination was effected by a fear that a finding of par-
tial abandonment would result in the adjudication of the Brother
Jonathan's fate by both the state and federal courts. 32 If the dis-
trict court subsequently made a finding of abandonment, Califor-
nia would have a colorable claim to the Brother Jonathan under
the ASA and the third question, whether the ASA preempted sec-
tion 6313, would be rendered moot.3 3 Accordingly, that issue was
not addressed. 3 4
The question of whether the ASA preempts a state statute gov-
erning shipwrecks not meeting the enumerated requirements of
the ASA remains unanswered by the Supreme Court. This com-
ment will attempt to answer that question with respect to the An-
tiquities Act. Part II of this comment outlines the ASA as enacted
by Congress. Part III outlines the Antiquities Act as enacted by
the State of Rhode Island. The question of whether Congress in-
tended to preempt state regulation of non-ASA shipwrecks is ad-
28. See id. at 500-01.
29. See id. at 507-08.
30. See id. at 508.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 508-09.
34. See id. at 509.
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dressed in part IV. Part V considers whether the Antiquities Act is
rendered invalid in light of the preemptive power had by the gen-
eral maritime law.
II. THE ASA
The ASA is divided into six sections.35 In order, those sections
are listed as: findings; definitions; rights of access; preparation of
guidelines; rights of ownership; and relationship to other laws. 36
Sections relevant to this preemption analysis are discussed below.
Under § 2101 (congressional findings) states have the respon-
sibility for the management of resources in State waters and sub-
merged lands.37 By way of the ASA, Congress included in this list
of resources "certain abandoned shipwrecks, which have been de-
serted and to which the owner has relinquished ownership rights
with no retention."38
Section 2105, which refers to the rights of ownership of these
certain abandoned shipwrecks, is the heart and soul of the ASA. 39
Under part (a) of this section, the United States asserts title to
abandoned shipwrecks that are either: 1) embedded in submerged
lands of a State;40 2) embedded in coralline formations protected
by a State on submerged lands of a State;4 1 or 3) on submerged
lands of a State and are included in or determined eligible for in-
clusion in the National Register of Historic Places (National Regis-
ter).42 Part (c) of § 2105 transfers shipwrecks meeting the above
enumerated requirements "to the State in or on whose submerged
lands the shipwreck is located."43
Section 2106 addresses the relationship of the ASA to other
laws. 44 In this section, Congress states that the admiralty laws of
salvage and finds do not apply to shipwrecks subject to the ASA. 45
35. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (1994).
36. See id.
37. See id. § 2101(a).
38. Id. § 2101(b) (emphasis added).
39. See id. § 2105.
40. See id. § 2105(a)(1).
41. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a)(2).
42. Id. § 2105(a)(3). Under 16 U.S.C..§ 470(a), the Secretary of the Interior
has broad discretion to establish the requisite guidelines for an object's inclusion in
the National Register. See id.
43. Id. § 2105(c).
44. See id. § 2106.
45. See id. § 2106(a).
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However, Congress specifically states that "the laws of the United
States relating to shipwrecks, other than those to which [the ASA]
applies" shall not be changed. 46
III. THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
Rhode Island governs the treatment of certain shipwrecks via
the Antiquities Act.47 "[Slubject to any local, state, or federal stat-
ute .... [Rhode Island claims] title to any underwater historic
properties lying on or under the bottoms of any.., navigable wa-
ters of the state . . ... 4 For purposes of the Antiquities Act,
"'[ulnderwater historic property' means any shipwreck.., that has
remained unclaimed for more than ten (10) years on the bottoms of
any navigable waters and territorial seas of the state."49 It is
through this acquisition of title that Rhode Island possesses the
power to govern these shipwrecks.
In recognition of their scientific and archeological value,50 the
state claims title to such shipwrecks and empowers the state his-
torical preservation commission to administer and prescribe regu-
lations necessary "to preserve, protect, recover and display
underwater historic properties and specimens derived from archeo-
logical sites."51 The historical preservation commission may pro-
mulgate rules including, but not limited to: "(a) [i]ssuance of
permits for the conduct of field investigations; (b) [riequirements
for reporting on the results of field investigations; [and] (c)
[pirovisions for the preservation and display of specimens ...."-52
"Field investigations" under the Antiquities Act means "the study
of the traces of human culture at any ... water site by means of
surveying, sampling, excavating, or removing surface or subsur-
face objects, or going on a site with that intent."53 Notably, the
historical preservation commission also has the power to deter-
mine a fair compensation for the permittee who recovers such "un-
derwater historic property."54  While the state historical
46. Id. § 2106(b).
47. See R.I. Gen Laws §§ 42-45.1-1 to 1-13 (1956) (1993 Reenactment).
48. Id. § 42-45.1-4(b).
49. Id. § 42-45.1-3 (d).
50. See id. § 42-45.1-2.
51. Id. § 42-45.1-5(1).
52. Id. § 42-45.1-5.
53. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-45.1-3(a).
54. Id. § 42-45.1-5(1)(d).
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preservation commission may establish the protocol for issuing
permits, the Antiquities Act imposes an obligation on any person
conducting a field investigation to obtain permission from any fed-
eral or state agencies having jurisdiction prior to any recovery op-
eration. 55 Additionally, Rhode Island retains title to all objects
recovered from field investigations.56
IV. Is THE ANTIQUITIES ACT PREEMPTED BY THE ASA?
Article VI of the United States Constitution states that federal
law is the "Supreme Law of the Land."57 This supremacy clause of
Article VI gives force and effect to the doctrine of preemption. 58
The preemption doctrine holds that federal legislation supersedes
any inconsistent state legislation when both regulate the same
subject matter.59 Thus, state action must succumb to conflicting
federal legislation. In Gibbons v. Ogden,60 Chief Justice Marshall
made clear that the federal system presupposes the statutory dom-
inance of federal law.61 He stated that "the act of Congress ... is
supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise
of powers not controverted, must yield to it."62 In discussing the
rationale behind the preemption doctrine, Justice Harlan noted
that "[tihe constitutional principles of pre-emption... are designed
. to avoid conflicting regulation of conduct by various official bod-
ies which might have some authority over the subject matter."63
Preemption analysis requires an examination of congressional
intent as determined by statutory language, structure and pur-
pose. 64 The Supreme Court has recognized three methods by
which state legislation will be preempted by federal law.6 5 First,
within constitutional limits, Congress may preempt state law by
55. See id. § 42-45.1-5(3).
56. See id.
57. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
58. See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-54
(1982).
59. See Black's Law Dictionary 1197 (7th ed. 1999).
60. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
61. See id. at 211.
62. Id.
63. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of Am. v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1971).
64. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
65. See id.
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expressly stating so.66 Second, without expressly stating so, Con-
gress' intent to preempt state law may be implied by the structure
or purpose of the federal statute.67 One type of implied preemp-
tion, field preemption, is recognized where the "scheme of federal
regulation is 'so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it .... ,"68 Al-
ternatively, state law is implicitly preempted to the extent that it
actually conflicts with federal law.69 This type of "conflict preemp-
tion" occurs when compliance with both federal legislation and a
state law is physically impossible 70 or where state law frustrates
the accomplishment and execution of Congress' purposes and
objectives.7 1
Express Preemption by the ASA?
Within constitutional limits, Congress may expressly preempt
state law. 72 The Supreme Court has provided a two-step test to
determine if a state law is expressly preempted by federal law. 73
The first step requires studying the plain language of the federal
statute.74 Most express preemption clauses are clearly contained
therein.75 An example of such a clause is contained in the Federal
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The ER-
ISA expressly provides that "provisions of [the statute] ... shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they... relate to any
employee benefit plan ....76
Second, if the federal statute clearly expresses Congress' in-
tent to preempt a class of state laws, a court must find that a par-
ticular state law in question falls within the class of laws that
Congress expressly intended to preempt.7 7 In Shaw v. Delta Air
66. See id.
67. See id. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
68. Id. (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
69. See id.
70. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (quoting Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
71. See id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
72. See id. 98-99.
73. See id. at 95-107.
74. See id. at 96-97.
75. See id. at 112 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
77. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
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Lines,78 the Supreme Court considered whether a New York state
law fell within the class of laws that were expressly preempted by
the ERISA.79 In its analysis, the Court referred to the plain lan-
guage, structure and legislative history of the statute.80 The Court
held that New York's law, "which prohibit[ed] employers from
structuring their employee benefit plans in a manner that discrim-
inates on the basis of pregnancy, and ... require[d] employers to
pay employees specific benefits, clearly 'relate[d] to' benefit
plans."8 ' Accordingly, the New York law was expressly preempted
by the ERISA.8 2
A review of the plain language of the ASA reveals no express
congressional intent to preempt state legislation. Congress knows
how to expressly preempt state law when it wants to do so. 8 3
While Congress does not need to use "any particular magic words"
to expressly preempt state law,8 4 the ASA contains no words that
clearly evidence its intent to do so. Congress was free to include
language similar to that contained in the ERISA if it wished to
expressly preempt state legislation. Accordingly, the Antiquities
Act is not expressly preempted by the ASA.
A failure on the part of Congress to expressly preempt state
law does not end the inquiry of whether state law must succumb to
"supreme" federal law. Preemption of a state statute by federal
law may also be implied under the theories of field preemption and
conflict preemption.8 5
Field Preemption
Field preemption acts to divest states of the ability to legislate
in an area that Congress has reserved for federal control. If Con-
gress has decided to "occupy the field," state legislation within that
field will be invalidated regardless of how well it comports with the
78. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
79. See id. at 100.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 97.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) ("provisions of [the statute] .. .shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they.., relate to any employee benefit
plan....").
84. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 112 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
85. See infra pp. 547-554 and accompanying notes.
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federal scheme. Field preemption has been described as a facet of
conflict preemption 86 By occupying the field, state legislation
would conflict with Congress' intent to be the sole authority in the
field and would, therefore, be nullified.87
In United States v. Locke,88 the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a state could impose its own regulations on
tankers operating in its waters in light of the then existing federal
regulatory scheme.8 9 The Court, in that case, struck down Wash-
ington state regulations purporting to impose navigation watch re-
quirements, language proficiency requirements and training
requirements on tanker crews. 90 The Court found that, by enact-
ing comprehensive regulatory framework and ratifying an interna-
tional treaty addressing the fields of tanker operation, personnel,
and training requirements, Congress presumably intended to pre-
clude any state legislation in these fields. Thus, the Washington
laws were preempted. 91
Additionally, under section 317-21-130 of the Washington Ad-
ministrative Code, Washington required tankers reaching its state
waters to report certain marine casualties, including: collisions, al-
lisions and near miss incidents, to the state regardless of where in
the world the incident may have happened. 92 Congress, however,
in 46 U.S.C. § 6101, had evidenced its intent that the Coast Guard
be the sole authority for imposing reporting obligations on ves-
sels.93 Section 6101 requires the Coast Guard to prescribe report-
ing regulations for specifically listed kinds of casualties.9 4 The
Court stated that Congress, by specifically stating the kinds of cas-
ualties that the regulations must cover, intended to subject vessels
to uniform reporting requirements as imposed by the Coast
Guard.95 Hence, state-imposed reporting requirements, such as
section 317-21-130, are preempted. 96
86. See English v. Gen. Elec., 496 U.S. 72, 79-80 n.5 (1990).
87. See id.
88. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
89. See id. at 94.
90. See id. at 113-14.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 114-15 (quoting Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-130 (1999)).
93. See id.
94. See Locke, 529 U.S. at 115-16.
95. See id. at 116.
96. See id.
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The Antiquities Act was passed to protect and govern un-
claimed shipwrecks in Rhode Island waters.97 By its own terms,
the Antiquities Act regulates in the field of determining ownership
rights to unclaimed shipwrecks. 98 The ASA governs ownership
rights to certain abandoned shipwrecks.99 Under the ASA, owner-
ship rights to these certain abandoned shipwrecks are addressed
in § 2105.100 Under § 2106, non-ASA shipwrecks are not effected
by the ASA and continue to be subject to the laws of the United
States.' 0
The language and structure of the ASA shows that Congress
addressed all shipwrecks in the ASA. While the ASA's determina-
tion of ownership rights is limited to a specific class of shipwrecks,
those shipwrecks that do not fall within that class are also specifi-
cally referred to.' 0 2 Title to those shipwrecks meeting the ASA's
enumerated requirements is transferred to the states. 0 3 The laws
of the United States govern non-ASA shipwrecks. 10 4 Apparently,
Congress intended to divide shipwrecks into two classes: those that
are governed by the states through the ASA and those that are
governed by the laws of the United States. The application of the
ASA and its nullification of the laws of salvage and finds' 05 grants
states the opportunity to acquire title to, and the corresponding
power to promulgate regulations relating to, a limited class of ship-
wrecks. 10 6 Non-ASA shipwrecks remain within the exclusive ad-
miralty jurisdiction of the federal courts as provided by Article III,
Section 2 of the United States Constitution.1 0 7 This language is
evidence that Congress intended the federal courts and the general
maritime law to remain the authoritative bodies in the field of gov-
erning all shipwrecks not falling within the grasp of the ASA.
97. See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-45.1-2, 1-3 (1956) (1993 Reenactment).
98. See id. §§ 42-45.1-3(d), 1-4(b).
99. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2105 (1994).
100. See id. § 2105.
101. See id. § 2106(b).
102. Compare 43 U.S.C, § 2105 with 43 U.S.C. § 2106 (referring to both ASA
and non-ASA shipwrecks).
103. See id. § 2105(c).
104. See id. § 2106(b).
105. See id. § 2106(a).
106. See id. § 2105(c).
107. See Deep Sea Research v. The Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d 379, 384 (9th
Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. California v. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. 491 (1998)
(reversing on other grounds).
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The structure of the ASA is such that it would be unreasonable
to infer that the determination of ownership rights to non-ASA
shipwrecks is left for state legislation. The comprehensive regula-
tory scheme of the ASA is evidence that Congress has intended to
control the manner in which ownership rights to shipwrecks will
be determined. In Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc.,108 the Su-
preme Court held that Illinois could not, pursuant to state law,
take action to suspend an interstate carrier's federally granted
right to operate in the state.10 9 In that case, the Court held that
states could not determine which interstate motor carriers could
operate in the state because the federal regulatory scheme in the
field was so comprehensive. 110 The federal law, the Motor Carrier
Act (MCA), gave the Interstate Commerce Commission (the Com-
mission) the right to issue interstate operating permits."' How-
ever, the MCA clearly prescribed the requisite steps that must be
taken to revoke a license once issued.112 Because the MCA so thor-
oughly covered the manner in which a license may be revoked, "it
would be odd if a state could" do so pursuant to its own laws. 113
Under the ASA, the United States asserts title to a limited
class of shipwrecks. To fall within the limited class of shipwrecks
governed by the ASA, it must be shown, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the shipwreck is: 1) abandoned and 2) either em-
bedded in submerged lands of a state, or embedded in state pro-
tected corralline formations on submerged lands of a state, or on
submerged lands of a state and eligible for or included in the Na-
tional Register.114 If it cannot be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that the shipwreck meets the above-enumerated require-
ments, the laws of the United States shall not be changed. 115 The
laws of the United States relating to shipwrecks are those of the
general maritime law. The restrictive nature of the requisite ele-
ments is evidence that Congress intended to carve out a narrow
class of shipwrecks that would be controlled by the states rather
than the general maritime law.
108. 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
109. See id. at 65.
110. See id. at 63.
111. See id. at 63.
112. See id. at 63-64.
113. Id. at 64.
114. See 43 U.S.C. § 2105 (1994).
115. See id. § 2106(b).
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The ASA's threshold requirement of abandonment comports
with its admiralty meaning. 116 Notably, however, courts are typi-
cally reluctant to consider a vessel abandoned. 117 Thus, the re-
quirement that a shipwreck be abandoned significantly limits the
ASA's application.
The ASA also requires that subject shipwrecks be located in or
on submerged lands of a state." 8 This language presumably com-
ports with the Submerged Lands Act (SLA).119 The SLA gives
states title to and jurisdiction over the submerged lands and natu-
ral resources within three miles of their coastline, with the excep-
tion of the Texas and Florida coasts in the Gulf of Mexico where
title and jurisdiction is extended to nine miles. 120 Accordingly, an
ASA shipwreck must be located in or on submerged land owned by
a state pursuant to the SLA or beneath its internal waters.
Lastly, Congress states that an ASA shipwreck must be either
on 121 submerged lands of a state and included in, or determined
eligible for inclusion in, the National Register or embedded 122 ei-
ther in the submerged lands of a state or state protected corralline
formations on submerged lands of a state.123 Congress has defined
embedded as "firmly affixed in... [the appropriate medium] such
that the use of tools of excavation is required in order to move the
bottom sediments to gain access to the shipwreck.... " 124 The fact
that shipwrecks meeting the embedded requirement must be so
embedded that tools are required for access is evidence of Con-
gress' intent to narrow the class of shipwrecks subject to the act.
The restrictive nature of the ASA's enumerated requirements
is evidence that Congress intended to preclude states' power to reg-
ulate with respect to ownership rights to non-ASA shipwrecks.
Like the MCA, the ASA is so thorough in its regulation that it
would be odd if states could control shipwrecks even if they do not
meet the enumerated requirements of the ASA. A review of the
116. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 508.
117. See Zych v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Believed to
be the SB "Lady Elgin," 755 F. Supp 213, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
118. See 43 U.S.C § 2105.
119. See id. §§ 1301-1315.
120. See id. § 1301.
121. See id. § 2105(a)(3).
122. See id. § 2105(a)(1).
123. See id. § 2105(a)(2).
124. 43 U.S.C. § 2102(a)
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history of the ASA reveals that Congress, in passing the legisla-
tion, intended to remove historical shipwrecks from federal con-
trol. 125 Senator Bill Bradley [D-NJ], who originally proposed the
bill in the Senate, expressed his concern over the way in which
federal courts sitting in admiralty jurisdiction were treating aban-
doned shipwrecks. 126 It was also hoped that the ASA would settle
disputes between treasure salvors, state and federal govern-
ments. 127 Congress attempted to achieve these goals by giving the
states the right to govern a limited class of shipwrecks. The fact
that the class is so limited, even in the face of Congress' perceived
presence of a problem, is additional evidence of Congress' intent to
keep non-ASA shipwrecks strictly subject to the general maritime
law as determined by the federal courts. Accordingly, the Antiqui-
ties Act is preempted to the extent that it acts to control ship-
wrecks to which the ASA does not apply.
Conflict Preemption?
Conflict preemption occurs where it is physically impossible to
comply with both a federal and state statute128 or where the state
statute impedes Congress' ability to achieve and execute its pur-
poses and goals.' 29 The Supreme Court has held that "any state
regulation is preempted if it interferes with the methods by which
the federal statute was designed to reach... [its] goal."130 Recog-
nizing states' interest in managing certain abandoned shipwrecks
located in its waters, Congress expressly gave states the power to
regulate the resource.' 3 ' That power to regulate arises when title
to those certain abandoned shipwrecks is asserted by the United
States and transferred to the state. 3 2
The Antiquities Act purports to grant the state "title to any
[shipwreck that has remained unclaimed and is] lying on or under
125. See 133 Cong. Rec. S7050-51 (Mar. 26, 1987).
126. See id. at S7050 ("Under the current system, Federal courts-sitting in ad-
miralty-have substantial policymaking power, which has resulted in uneven judg-
ments about the historical value of shipwrecks.").
127. See Joseph C. Sweeney, An Overview of Commercial Salvage Principles in
the Context of Marine Archeology, 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 185, 197 (1999).
128. See Gade v. Natl Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,98 (1992) (quoting
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
129. See id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
130. Id. at 103 (quoting Intl Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987).
131. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101(a), 2105(c) (1994).
132. See id. § 2105(c).
RHODE ISLAND'S SHIPWRECK LAWS
the bottoms of any other navigable waters of the state...." 133 A
comparison of the Antiquities Act and the ASA shows that the An-
tiquities Act may govern shipwrecks that are not within the class
of shipwrecks governed by the ASA. An example of such a ship-
wreck would be a fishing vessel that has not been abandoned
under traditional admiralty law but has remained unclaimed for
eleven years and is resting on submerged lands of Rhode Island's
Narragansett Bay. This shipwreck does not meet the ASA's
threshold requirement of abandonment under traditional admi-
ralty law.134 Consequently, the ASA does not apply. Further, as-
suming that the fishing vessel is not eligible for inclusion in the
National Register, the secondary ASA requirement of eligibility for
or inclusion in the National Register or embedded in the sub-
merged lands or corralline formations of a state is not met. The
Antiquities Act does not require a shipwreck to be abandoned
under admiralty law or embedded in submerged lands or corralline
formations before it purports to grant title to the state. As this
would be a shipwreck that has remained unclaimed for more than
ten years and is lying on the bottom of navigable waters of Rhode
Island, the state would have a right of title to the shipwreck under
the Antiquities Act but not the ASA.
The ASA permits a state to govern shipwrecks meeting its
enumerated requirements by transferring title to the state. 135
Therefore, the Antiquities Act does not conflict with the ASA to the
extent it governs ASA shipwrecks. However, in § 2106(b) of the
ASA, Congress has mandated that the laws of the United States
shall apply to all non-ASA shipwrecks. 136 Accordingly, non-ASA
"shipwrecks continue to be subject to the exclusive admiralty juris-
diction of the federal courts, as provided by Article III, section 2 of
the United States Constitution."137 Consequently, laws governing
non-ASA shipwrecks remain those of the general maritime law as
133. Id. § 41-45.1-4(b). The actual wording of the statute is "underwater his-
toric properties." Id. Section 41-45.1-3(d) provides that for purposes of the Antiq-
uities Act of Rhode Island, "'[u]nderwater historic property' means any shipwreck
... that has remained unclaimed for more than ten (10) years on the bottoms of
any navigable waters and territorial seas of the State." Id. § 41-45.1-3(d).
134. See California v. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. 491, 508 (1998).
135. See 43 U.S.C. § 2105(c).
136. See id. § 2106(b).
137. Deep Sea Research v. The Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d 379, 384 (9th Cir.
1996), rev'd sub nor. California v. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. 491 (1998) (revers-
ing on other grounds).
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determined by the federal courts. Hence, the Antiquities Act poses
a potential conflict with § 2106(b) and the general maritime law to
the extent that it governs non-ASA shipwrecks. As § 2106 implic-
itly states that non-ASA shipwrecks remain subject to the general
maritime law, a discussion of conflict preemption by the ASA re-
quires a review and comparison of the general maritime law and
the Antiquities Act.
V. Is THE ANTIQUITIES ACT PREEMPTED BY THE GENERAL
MARITIME LAW?
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution vests
power in the federal courts to hear and decide cases involving ad-
miralty or maritime jurisdiction. 138 The Supreme Court has inter-
preted this provision as implicit authorization for Congress to
legislate in maritime matters.139 Further, when federal legislation
conflicts with the general maritime law, federal legislation will
prevail.140 In the absence of a controlling federal statute, "the gen-
eral maritime law, as [determined] by the federal courts consti-
tutes part of our national law applicable to matters within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."' 4 ' As part of the national
law, the general maritime law has preemptive power under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and will prevail over a con-
flicting state law. 142 The Supreme Court has, however, been less
than clear in its attempts to provide a predictable analytical
framework with which to analyze the problem of preemption in the
admiralty context. Justice Scalia, speaking to the subject, noted
that "it would be idle to pretend that the line separating permissi-
ble from impermissible state regulation is readily discernable in
our admiralty jurisprudence, or indeed is even entirely consistent
... .-143 Indeed, the situation can be so confusing as to defy coher-
ent synthesis. As the First circuit once put it, "[d]iscerning the law
in this area is far from easy; one might tack a sailboat into a fog
bank with more confidence."' 44
138. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
139. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 577 (1874); Jensen, 244 U.S.
at 215-16.
140. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990).
141. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 215.
142. See id. at 215-16.
143. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 452 (1994).
144. Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 624 (1st Cir. 1994)
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Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen145 is the leading decision on
maritime preemption. 146 In that case, the United States Supreme
Court held that state legislation may not contravene the essential
uniformity that is provided by the general maritime law.147 Apply-
ing this principle, the Court struck down a New York state law
providing compensation for injuries and deaths of maritime em-
ployees without regard to fault.148 The Court noted the impor-
tance of uniformity in the obligations imposed on foreign ships
entering state ports.149 If New York could impose its own obliga-
tions on foreign ships entering its harbors, other states could do
likewise.' 50 The inevitable destruction of uniformity in maritime
matters would impermissibly hamper the "freedom of navigation
between the States and with foreign countries."' 5 ' Accordingly, the
New York state law was preempted to the extent that it conflicted
with the uniformity in maritime matters as provided by the gen-
eral maritime law and the Constitution. 152
Over time, the Jensen principle has been fiercely attacked, and
subsequent Supreme Court opinions have allowed state law to dis-
place admiralty law in certain situations. For example, in Ameri-
can Dredging Co. v. Miller,153 the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a Louisiana state law rendering the doctrine of
forum non conveniens unavailable in Jones Act and maritime law
cases brought in Louisiana state courts was preempted by the gen-
eral maritime law.' 54 Applying the rule set forth in Jensen, the
Court considered whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens
was either a "characteristic feature" of admiralty law or a "doctrine
whose uniform application is necessary to maintain the 'proper
harmony' of maritime law."' 55 As to the first question, the Court
held that, although the doctrine of forum non conveniens "may
have been given its earliest and most frequent expression in admi-
145. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
146. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 273, 291
(1999).
147. See Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215-16.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 217.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. 510 U.S. 443 (1994).
154. See id. at 445-46.
155. Id. at 447.
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ralty cases,"156 it was not a characteristic feature of admiralty law
because it neither originated nor had exclusive application in ad-
miralty law.157 Further, because the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens is a procedural rather than a substantive rule, its
application would unlikely promote uniform results in maritime
cases.158 Accordingly, the Louisiana law was not preempted by the
general maritime law.r'9
The question addressed by this section, therefore, is whether
the general maritime law preempts a state law, such as Rhode Is-
land's Antiquities Act, that purports to determine title to certain
shipwrecks. Applying the American Dredging analysis to deter-
mine the preemptive effect that the general maritime law has on
the Antiquities Act, one must begin by outlining the admiralty
laws of salvage and finds. Those laws must then be compared with
the Antiquities Act to determine whether a conflict exists. Con-
flicting provisions of the Antiquities Act will be preempted by the
general maritime law to the extent they materially prejudice the
"characteristic features" of the general maritime law or interfere
with the "proper harmony and uniformity" of that law. 160 As Con-
gress has stated that the laws of salvage and finds shall not apply
to ASA shipwrecks, 16 1 any preemption by the general maritime
law will be limited to the extent that the Antiquities Act applies to
non-ASA shipwrecks.
Under the general maritime law, shipwrecks are governed by
the doctrines of salvage and finds.' 6 2 Salvage is the compensation
awarded to persons whose voluntary assistance saves, in whole or
in part, a ship at sea or her cargo or both.'6 3 Salvage is also
awarded for the recovery of such property from "actual peril or
loss, as in cases of shipwreck recovery, derelict, or recapture."164
The purpose of granting a salvage award is to promote efforts to
save property and lives that are in danger of being lost or de-
156. Id. at 449.
157. See id. at 450.
158. See id. at 455.
159. See Am. Dredging Co., 510 U.S. at 450.
160. See id. at 447.
161. See 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a) (1994).
162. See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 567-68 (5th Cir. 1981) (Treasure Salvors II).
163. See The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1879).
164. Id.
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stroyed at sea and to discourage embezzlement. 165 Such efforts are
promoted by setting and determining awards with care and with
regard to the risk incurred by the salvor as well as the benefit con-
ferred upon the property owner. 166
There are three formal elements of a salvage claim under the
general maritime law. 167 First, the salvaged property must be in
marine peril, meaning that it is at risk of loss, destruction or dete-
rioration.' 68 Shipwrecks have been found to be in "peril" because
the vessel is still in danger of being lost to its surrounding ele-
ments.169 Second, the salvage service must be voluntarily ren-
dered and not made pursuant to a contractual or other
obligation. 170 Finally, the salvage efforts must be at least partially
successful. 17 1 This distinguishes "pure" salvage from contract sal-
vage where the parties are free to set compensation regardless of
success.' 7 2 A property owner, however, may refuse salvage service
and avoid having to pay a salvage award. 173 In such cases, "sal-
vor" has been referred to as "a gratuitous intermeddler." 74 A per-
son who can show that his actions and the surrounding
circumstances match the above elements is entitled to a monetary
salvage award not exceeding the value of the property saved.YTs It
is important to note that a salvage award is limited to monetary
compensation rather than title to the salvaged property.'76
A salvage act gives rise to a right to a salvage reward.'7 7 The
salvage reward may be enforced by attaching a maritime lien and
165. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869); accord Mason v. Ship
Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240, 266-267 (1879).
166. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law §16-7, at 367
(3d ed. 2001).
167. See The Sabine, 101 U.S. at 384.
168. See id.
169. See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 569 F2d. 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1978) (Treasure Salvors I). But see
Subaqueous Exploration & Archeology, Ltd. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Aban-
doned Vessel, 577 F. Supp. 597, 611 (D. Md. 1983) (holding that ancient ship-
wrecks are not in marine peril so the law of salvage is inapplicable).
170. See The Sabine, 101 U.S. at 384, 390; Schoenbaum, supra note 166, at 359.
171. See The Sabine, 101 U.S. at 384, 390.
172. See Flagship Marine Serv., Inc. v. Belcher Towing Co., 966 F.2d 602, 605
(11th Cir. 1992).
173. See Bonifay v. The Paraporti, 145 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Va. 1956).
174. See id.
175. See The Sabine, 101 U.S. at 390.
176. See id. at 390-91.
177. See Schoenbaum, supra note 166 at 357-58.
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proceeding in rem directly against the property salvaged or pro-
ceeding in personam against the owner of such property.178 There
are two main rationales underlying maritime attachment.' 7 9 The
first is to ensure that a judgment will be satisfied if the suit is
successful.180 The second rationale is that attachment will ensure
that a defendant will appear in an action.18 ' "[Ain in rem suit
against a vessel is... distinctively an admiralty proceeding, and is
hence within the exclusive province of the federal courts." 1 2 Con-
sequently, "state courts 'may not provide a remedy in rem for any
cause of action within the admiralty jurisdiction.'"'18 3
The law of finds originated as a common law doctrine and has
evolved into and developed its own application in admiralty
cases.' 84 The law of finds applies to those shipwrecks that have
been abandoned. 5 5 A finding of abandonment requires clear and
convincing proof, such as an express declaration of abandonment
by the owner or the passage of time that gives rise to a reasonable
inference that the shipwreck has been abandoned. 86 The federal
district courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases in rem in-
volving the law of finds.18 7 Under this doctrine, title to the "found"
property vests in the person who reduces it to possession.'8 8
As an initial question, one may wonder if the Antiquities Act is
invalid simply because the state has taken title to certain "un-
claimed shipwrecks." The Supreme Court has long held that "a
state statute may grant rights which will be enforced in an admi-
178. See The Sabine, 101 U.S. at 388.
179. See Aurora Mar. Co. v. Abdullah Mohamed Fahem & Co., 85 F.3d 44, 48
(2d Cir. 1996).
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Am. Dredging Co. v, Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1994) (quoting The
Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1867)).
183. Id. at 446 (quoting Red Cross Line v. At. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124
(1924)).
184. See Mark R. Baumgartner, Federal Jurisdiction Over State Claims to
Shipwrecks: Should the Eleventh Amendment go Down With the Ship?, 8 Wm. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 469, 474-75 (2000).
185. See Adams v. Unione Medeterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 671(5th Cir.
2000).
186. See id.
187. See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 567-68 (5th Cir. 1981) (Treasure Salvors II).
188. See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 569 F2d. 330, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1978) (Treasure Salvors I).
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ralty court."18 9 However, those rights must not be had at the ex-
pense of national uniformity in admiralty law as provided by the
Constitution. 190 Accordingly, the Antiquities Act's grant of title to
certain unclaimed shipwrecks to Rhode Island, may be enforced in
an admiralty court to the extent that it does not materially
prejudice the "characteristic features" of the general maritime law
or interfere with the "proper harmony and uniformity" of that
law.' 9 '
There are, however, three main inconsistencies between the
general maritime laws of salvage and finds and provisions of the
Antiquities Act. The first relates to the Antiquities Act's apparent
definition of abandonment. Although the statute makes no explicit
reference to the term "abandonment," one may assume that the
requirement that a shipwreck remain unclaimed for ten years
before the state asserts title relates to a finding of abandon-
ment. 19 2 Under the general maritime law, a salvor will not acquire
title to a shipwreck unless the shipwreck is abandoned.1 93 The
general maritime law has traditionally found abandonment when
ownership rights have been publicly and expressly renounced.
9 4
However, some courts have been willing to infer abandonment by
the passage of time coupled with an owner's failure to attempt to
recover the object. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Treasure Sal-
vors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Ves-
sel (Treasure Salvors ),19 held that shipwrecks which have been
lost for centuries may be presumed to be abandoned. In that case,
the court stated that it would be absurd to assume that a vessel
that had sank over 300 years before it was finally discovered was
still owned. 196 However, in its 1991 decision in Zych v. The Un-
189. W. Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 240 (1921) (citing Cooley v. Bd. of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851)).
190. See Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308, 314 (1919).
191. See Am. Dredging Co. v, Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447 (1994).
192. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-45.1-4(b) (1956) (1992 Reenactment).
193. See Schoenbaum, supra note 166, at §§ 16-5 to 16-7 (absent a finding of
abandonment, a salvor may be entitled to a salvage award not exceeding the value
of the property salvaged).
194. See Sea Hunt, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 221 F.3d 634,
641 (4th Cir. 2000)
195. 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978).
196. See id. at 337 ("Disposition of a wrecked vessel whose very location has
been lost for centuries as though its owner were still in existence stretches a fiction
to absurd lengths.").
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identified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be the SB
"Lady Elgin,"197 the District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois held that a 130 year period of inactivity on the part of a vessel
owner was insufficient to infer abandonment. 198 The court ex-
cused the owner's inactivity because the owner had not taken any
affirmative steps to express an intent to relinquish ownership
rights to the Lady Elgin and, prior to the late 1980s, it was not
technologically feasible to recover the wreck.199 The court stated
that an owner need not attempt to recover a shipwreck to avoid
abandoning its interest when "such efforts would have... [a) mini-
mal chance[] for success." 200
Recent developments have made it technologically feasible to
locate and access previously undiscoverable and unrecoverable
shipwrecks. 201 If courts follow the reasoning in Lady Elgin and
begin tolling the time of inactivity to infer abandonment upon the
availability of technologically feasible methods of discovery and re-
covery, even the passage of centuries may not justify a finding of
abandonment.
The Antiquities Act seems to allow a finding of abandonment
after the passage of ten years even without an express renuncia-
tion of ownership rights.20 2 However, as in Treasure Salvors I and
the Lady Elgin, courts have spoken to the requisite lapse of time to
infer abandonment in terms of centuries. 20 3 A finding of abandon-
ment under the general maritime law is a prerequisite to an asser-
tion of title to a shipwreck. 20 4 This requisite finding of
abandonment as a precondition to a transfer of ownership rights
under the law of finds is the fundamental distinction between the
admiralty laws of salvage and finds. 20 5 Under admiralty law, if the
shipwreck is not abandoned, a salvor may be entitled to a mone-
tary salvage award, not ownership rights. 206 The Antiquities Act
197. 755 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
198. See id. at 216.
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. See generally Roderick Mather, Technology and the Search for Shipwrecks,
30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 175 (1999) (discussing recent technological and analytical
advances that have aided in the search and recovery of shipwrecks).
202. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-45.1-3 (1956) (1993 Reenactment).
203. See supra pp. 558-560 and accompanying notes.
204. See Schoenbaum, supra note 166, at 373-74.
205. See Schoenbaum, supra note 166, at 373-76.
206. See The Sabine, 101 U.S. at 390-91.
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conflicts with the general maritime law in that it allows a finding
of abandonment after an incredibly short time as compared to the
general maritime law.20 7 A state alteration of this fundamental
admiralty characteristic would materially prejudice and disrupt
the proper harmony of the general maritime law. If one state may
provide a right of title upon the passage of ten years, another may
presumably do so after five, ten or fifteen years. Consequently, the
laws of different states may alter the relief granted in such cases,
thereby destroying the uniformity sought by admiralty law. Ac-
cordingly, a state law purporting to grant a right of title to a ship-
wreck must do so subject to a finding of abandonment in
accordance with admiralty rules. Hence, the Antiquities Act is
preempted by the general maritime law to the extent that it alters
the nature of rules governing abandonment.
The Antiquities Act is also suspect in its determination of the
manner in which salvage awards are set. Under the terms of the
Antiquities Act, the state historical preservation commission may
set and determine a fair compensation to be awarded to a person
who salvages a shipwreck claimed by the state.20 8 Absent the stat-
ute, a salvor may retrieve the shipwreck and be granted a salvage
award by the appropriate federal district court.20 9 While there is
no set formula for determining the amount of the award,210 the
amount must be limited to the value of the property salvaged.21'
Under the general maritime law, the federal district courts have
discretion to determine the awards given to salvors. 212 In deter-
mining the appropriate salvage award, admiralty courts have tra-
ditionally considered:
(1.) The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the sal-
vage service: (2.) The promptitude, skill, and energy dis-
played in rendering the service and saving the property: (3.)
The value of the property employed by the salvors in render-
ing the service, and the danger to which such property was
207. Cf. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-45.1-3 with Zych v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and
Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be the SB "Lady Elgin," 755 F. Supp. 213, 216 (N.D.
Ill. 1991) (court was unwilling to infer abandonment even after a 130 year period of
owner's inactivity).
208. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-45.1-5(d).
209. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 13-14 (1869).
210. See Schoenbaum, supra note 166, at 364.
211. See The Sabine, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 384, 390 (1879).
212. See Trico Marine Operators, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 809 F. Supp. 440, 441
(E.D. La. 1992).
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exposed: (4.) The risk incurred by the salvors in securing the
property from the impending peril: (5.) The value of the prop-
erty saved: (6.) The degree of danger from which the property
was rescued.213
Some courts have also considered the salvor's effort to protect
the environment when calculating the amount of the award.214
This discretion has led to a wide range of salvage awards. For ex-
ample, in Hernandez v. Roberts,215 the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida applied these principles and awarded
a pleasure boater a salvage award of only $500 because of the rela-
tively minor risk and effort involved. In Margate Shipping Co. v.
M/V JA Orgeron,2 16 on the other hand, the Fifth Circuit granted a
$4.125 million salvage award, the largest on record, for a private
salvor's efforts in saving a valuable external fuel tank for NASA's
space shuttle.217
Under the Antiquities Act, the state historical preservation
commission may set and determine the award for salvage efforts
rather than an independent Article III admiralty court.218 A situa-
tion whereby the party holding title to the wreck, the state, will be
setting the salvage award is prejudicial to the manner by which a
salvage award is determined under the general maritime law. One
may argue, however, that this prejudice to the general maritime
law may not be material if the public is made aware that the avail-
able remedy, compensation set by the historical preservation com-
mission, promotes salvage efforts. In setting salvage awards, the
ultimate concern of federal courts is to promote the general mari-
time law's policy of encouraging "seamen and others" to undertake
salvage operations. 219 If the compensation set by the historical
preservation society encourages salvage operations, any prejudice
inuring to the general maritime law may not be material if the
general maritime law's ultimate goals are achieved, albeit through
a different system.
Even if it can be successfully argued that the Antiquities Act's
method of setting salvage awards does not materially prejudice the
213. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 14.
214. See Trico Marine Operators, 809 F. Supp. at 443.
215. 675 F. Supp. 1329 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
216. 143 F.3d 976 (5th Cir. 1998).
217. See id. at 980.
218. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-45.1-5(d) (1956) (1993 Reenactment).
219. See Schoenbaum, supra note 166, at 365.
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general maritime law, such a situation seems repugnant to John
Locke's idea that no man should be a judge in his own case. 220
Theoretically, this basic principle is reflected and implemented in
the separation of powers doctrine.221 Under the Antiquities Act,
the state will have the final say as to what compensation will be
awarded to a salvor of its property. The presence of the state's pe-
cuniary interest in the matter deprives a salvor of the right to have
independent Article III admiralty judge determine the compensa-
tion justified for salvage efforts. This apparent conflict of interest
seems to represent an unacceptable collapse of the separation of
powers doctrine as posited by John Locke.
The third inconsistency between the Antiquities Act and the
general maritime law is the Antiquities Act's prohibition of salvage
efforts except upon permission of certain state or federal agen-
cies. 22 2 Pursuant to section 42-45.1-5 (3) of the Antiquities Act,
potential salvors must obtain permission from "any federal or state
agencies having jurisdiction prior to conducting" any salvage oper-
ations.223 A fundamental principle of the general maritime law is
that all seafaring persons and potential salvors be free to explore
the open waters for pleasure, commerce, or otherwise to ply their
trades. 224 In Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 225 the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida struck down a Florida statute that restricted a
person's right to explore navigable waters for salvageable sites
without receiving permission from the state.226 Under the general
maritime law, a person is free to undertake salvage operations un-
less another party has already secured an exclusive right to sal-
vage a wreck site by demonstrating that salvage efforts are
currently: "(1) undertaken with due diligence, (2) ongoing, and (3)
220. See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government § 13 in Two Treatises
of Government at 275 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1689).
221. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On The Danger of Wearing Two Hats: Mis-
tretta and Morrison Revisited, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 417, 430 (1997).
222. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-45.1-5(3).
223. See id.
224. See Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sail-
ing Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186, 203 (S.D. Fl. 1981).
225. 525 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. Fl. 1981).
226. See id. at 203-04.
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clothed with some prospect of success."227 Thus, under the general
maritime law, a potential salvor may undertake salvage operations
unless another party has secured salvage rights to the exclusion of
others.228 Accordingly, the Florida statute was preempted by the
general maritime law.2
29
Requiring a person to receive permission before commencing
salvage activities prejudices the general maritime law's principle
that navigable waters are free for exploration by potential sal-
vors. 230 Thus, to the extent that section 42-45.1-5 (3) prevents a
salvor from salvaging a non-ASA shipwreck without permission,
the Rhode Island law poses an impermissible conflict with the gen-
eral maritime law. Accordingly, this provision of the Antiquities
Act is also preempted by the general maritime law.
VI. CONCLUSION
A preemption analysis of the Antiquities Act reveals some sig-
nificant flaws with its potential application to non-ASA ship-
wrecks. Although Congress has not expressly preempted state
legislation governing non-ASA shipwrecks, congressional intent to
preclude state legislation in that field is implicit in the language
and structure of the ASA. Also, to the extent that the Antiquities
Act governs non-ASA shipwrecks, the Antiquities Act impermissi-
bly conflicts with the general maritime law in its alteration of ad-
miralty rules of abandonment, determination of salvage awards
and restrictions on rights to salvage.
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